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Introduction
Seasonal migration of Poles for work in German agriculture became a mass phenomenon by the end of the 19th century, and has continued to be an important component of Polish labor migration well into the early 21st century. In spite of its remarkable durability, this form of migration has usually been looked at over fairly narrow time periods. In this paper, we look at seasonal migration from Poland to Germany over the long run, and we seek to unravel what sustained this form of migration for so long. In this vein, we maintain that current-day seasonal migration from Poland to Germany has its roots in the distant past.
We allude to the role of a tradition of engagement in seasonal migration. We show how this factor helps explain the long-term durability of seasonal migration from Poland to Germany, over and beyond economic considerations. Evidence in support of the role of tradition is provided, among other things, by the continuation of the seasonal flow of migrants from once border regions -which became internal regions following WWII, despite the fact that since the redrawing of the German-Polish border, proximity is no longer a factor encouraging repeated, short-term seasonal moves.
By tradition we mean a tendency to act in a particular manner over a long period of time and across generations. When that which conferred an economic benefit in the past is increasingly emulated, a tradition is created. Acting in accordance with tradition side-steps frequent re-assessments and evaluationsś people act "traditionally" because their predecessors did. When tradition takes a strong hold, it is only slightly vulnerable, if not immune altogether, to events and interruptions that interfere with people acting in concert with tradition. For example, an intergenerational lull can quickly be reversed. In as much as migration becomes a way of life for individuals and communities, the term tradition, as used in this paper, is akin to the concept of "culture."
Although in some sense networks can be perceived as a manifestation of tradition, we do not equate tradition with networks because each can impact on migration processes and outcomes differently. Whereas networks can act as purveyors of tradition, they can evolve for reasons that have nothing to do with tradition (Stark and Jakubek, 2013) . Conversely, tradition can maintain the tendency to resort to and restore migration even in the absence of networks.
In one particular context, as we show below, a combination of tradition and networks was more powerful in shaping migration flows than administrative interference. In another context we note that networks could help reinvigorate migration because they were premised on tradition, and that when tradition could be expressed, network-type links were poised to play a role in churning migration.
The inclination to go back in time in search of an explanation for the current process of seasonal migration was motivated, in part, by recent studies of contemporary seasonal migration (Kaczmarczyk and Łukowski, 2004; Stark and Fan, 2007; K pi ska, 2008) . These studies prompted us to look at a persistent seasonal migration flow through the lens of the mechanisms that added sustainability to it and helped to sustain it even when it was interrupted, in different ways and at different times, by substantial changes in the economic, political, regulatory, and legal environment. (These interruptions included two World Wars and a multiple reshuffling of borders in the first half of the 20th century).
Before turning to detailed reasoning, a word of caution is in order. The current paper is exploratory in nature, and tentative in its conclusions. We are aware of the need to sift harder through archives, primary data sources, statistical yearbooks, newspapers of the time, memoirs and the like. We are also aware of the benefits to be conferred by looking further at regional characteristics (ranging from population densities to agrarian structures) at the end of the 19th century as possible additional contributing factors affecting the participation of some regions but not of others in seasonal migration. Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that the novel contributing factor that we have identified is sufficiently powerful to merit us presenting it, and enticing enough to inspire and trigger follow up research.
As we go back in time studying migration from Poland to Germany, we are reminded that Poland did not exist in the 19th century or well into the 20th century, that is, not until 1918.
As a result of three partitions (1772, 1793, 1795) , the territory of Poland (the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth) was divided between the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, and Habsburg Austria. Thus, when we refer to migration from Poland prior to 1918, we have in mind the Russian partition (the Kingdom of Poland in , and the Austrian partition. In other words, we refer to seasonal migrations that took place across state borders, and we do not delve into seasonal forays of Polish workers to Prussian and German agriculture within Germany.
In the next three sections we allude to the persistence of the seasonal migration outflow over time and (across shifting) space. In section 2, we study the onset and the build up of the tradition of seasonal migration from Poland to Germany, concentrating on the period up to WWII. In section 3, we consider WWII era and its immediate aftermath. In section 4, we study the recent past. Final thoughts are presented in the Conclusions section.
2. The onset and the building up of a tradition: a brief overview of seasonal migration from Poland to Germany before WWII 2.1. Seasonal migration from Poland to Germany at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries A convenient starting point for studying substantial seasonal migration from Poland to Germany over the long stretch of time is 1885. In that year, approximately 30,000 Poles who were subjects of Russian Poland (the Polish Kingdom) or of Austrian Poland (Galicia), but who in a good many cases were long-term residents of Prussia, were deported from Prussia (Wajda, 1976; Łuczak, 1988; Olsson, 1996) . The reason for the expulsions (though not of Poles from Prussian Poland who were German subjects) was the żerman authorities' fear that the mass inflow of Polish labor migrants to the eastern provinces of Germany could harm the Germanization process in the area.
At the same time, due to a significant loss of population in the East and the consequent shortage of manual workers, the eastern provinces of Germany experienced a growing demand for foreign workers. The population loss was caused by two factors: overseas migration to the U.S., which began in the late 1860s, and internal migration to the industrial centers of the western provinces that started to replace overseas migration in the 1880s. The shortage was exacerbated by the intensification of German agriculture. By the end of the 19th century, with the introduction of new crops, in particular sugar beets (a very labor intensive crop), and the adoption of new technologies, farmers needed many workers during the summer but just a few during the winter. Before, workers were needed much more evenly throughout the year. These factors combined to create a growing demand for a foreign seasonal workforce (Bade, 1980; Olsson, 1996) .
In the wake of the deportations and as a consequence of politically-motivated decisions, until 1890 the borders of Germany were effectively closed to Polish workers from Russian Poland and Austrian Poland. Neither the deportations nor the closure of the borders could, however, suppress the demand for seasonal work or the willingness to supply it. Even when political voices are loud, economic needs often speak louder. In 1890, in response to protests by German landowners, the borders were re-opened to Polish workers, although in order "to satisfy the economic interests without jeopardizing security policy considerations" (Bade, 2003: 157) , and to prevent settlement, workers were ordered to return home for the winter season, a system of mandatory registration was enacted, and work was confined largely to agriculture (Wajda, 1976: 66; Łuczak, 1988: 108-112; Herbert, 1990) . Notably, Poles were not permitted to work in the mining and steel industries of the Ruhr region. "The rationale was to prevent 'a Polonization of the west,' which it was feared would follow the 'Polonization of the east' if foreign Poles were to mingle with their Prussian brethren in the Polish 'colonies' of the Ruhr" (Bade, 1980: 369-370) .
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Between 1890 and 1914, seasonal migration gained considerable significance, and "the agricultural capacity of eastern Prussia had become directly dependent on foreign labor from across the eastern borders" (Bade, 1980: 369) . The inviting demand helped sustain the "regularization" of supply. According to several accounts, by the start of WWI, the number of seasonal workers arriving in Germany from Russian Poland and Austrian Poland had reached 600,000 a year (Mytkowicz, 1917; Jarzyna, 1933; Kołodziej, 1982 ; see also Morawska, 1989; Olsson, 1996; and Pietraszek, 2003) . More people participated in seasonal migration to Germany than in overseas migration, and often the very same people migrated year after year (Pilch, 1984: 10) . Such repetitive behavior already contains the seeds of a habit, and a habit is the harbinger of a tradition. Predominantly, the seasonal migrants were Poles from Russian Poland, but Poles and Ruthenians from Galicia were present as well. Data assembled by the Warsaw Statistical Committee on the number of passes issued to workers from the Polish Kingdom in 1890-1912 (the only data we know of that provide geographical dispersion by sending regions) attest to the dynamics of the process in the pre-WWI period. In 1890, more than 17,000 passes were issued. In 1900, the number of passes reached approximately 119,000. This number nearly doubled in 1908 to approximately 235,000 passes, and in 1912, it increased further to approximately 322,000 (Appendix 1, Table 1 ). Although the data exclude Polish workers from Austrian Poland, at the outset the main recipients of seasonal 1 The number of Poles living in the Ruhr region (Rhineland-Westphalia) reached 475,000 in 1912, of which 210,000 were children below the age of 14 (Murzynowska, 1972; Bro ek, 1984: 178) . Their presence was due to an internal migration to "the west" of Poles who were living in Prussian Poland. However, these Poles were not relevant to the seasonal migration of other Poles for work in agriculture. In fact, their presence reinforced the reluctance of the German authorities to allow in more Poles. work permits were migrants from Russian Poland. We need to bear in mind that the data are of registered outflows; it is likely that there were some non-registered workers, especially from the border areas -the "birth place," as we strive to show, of seasonal migration of Polish workers to German agriculture. Żor example, "The director of the żerman Agency for Żarm Workers estimated the number of illegals in 1907 at some 20% of the number of foreigners with a legal permit" (Herbert, 1990: 360) .
The data available on the regions of origin of seasonal migrants reveal that from the very outset, seasonal migration to Germany from Russian Poland was largely confined to a subset of areas. Geographical proximity was an important determinant: the seasonal workers who came to the east of Germany, chiefly to Posen, East and West Prussia, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, and Saxony (Łuczak, 1988: 112) , originated, in the main, from areas bordering In sum, the picture that emerges is that in 1890 seasonal migration from Russian Poland to Germany was confined to inhabitants of a few counties located close to the Polish-German border. The growing demand for seasonal workers in German agriculture was first met by increasing the supply from a select set, with adjoining counties joining in when the demand grew further. The seasonal migration did not arise out of nowhere, however. "Seasonal shortand middle-distance harvest migrations of Polish peasantry within the eastern European countryside were already commonplace during the 1860s and 1870s" (Morawska, 1989: 179) .
For instance, peasants from the county of Wielu in Kalisz province were already participating in seasonal migration to German agriculture in 1864 -the year in which peasants were granted property rights to the plots they tilled before as tenants, and were thus free economically to expend effort away from home without fear of losing control of their land -and their numbers were growing every year. Small numbers of workers were being recruited by the Prussian authorities for work in agriculture -mainly in Silesia -at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries when, as a result of the second partition of Poland in 1793, for almost 15 years the county of Wielu belonged to the Kingdom of Prussia (Milczarek, 1977: 7) . The other counties on the list of sending counties in 1890 also used to belong to the Kingdom of Prussia, either as a result of the second or the third partition of Poland (in 1795). Thus, in a way, seasonal migration on a mass scale was a continuation of the practice of peasants who, once granted freehold and masters of their own fate, found it economically advantageous to hire themselves out for agricultural work away from their place of residence. Geographical proximity, and other links with żermany, account for their "going west."
During WWI, the Polish workers in Germany were mainly forced laborers -either prisoners of war, or civilian workers. The latter were "recruited" in Russian Poland by a mixture of direct coercion and economic pressure (the worsening economic conditions in the occupied territories compelled people to seek work in Germany, cf. Bade, 2003: 173) when the occupation of Russian Poland by Germany -an important pre-war recruitment areastarted in October 1915. However, the first batch of workers consisted of seasonal migrants from Russian Poland who worked in Germany in 1914 and who, a mere few days after the outbreak of the war, and like all other workers from enemy countries, were confined to their place of work. Soon after that, Polish workers were allowed to work in German industry.
Thus, a ban on returning replaced the compulsory pre-war return-home policy for Polish laborers (seasonal migration); workers were coerced to stay in Germany until the end of the war. (Those regulations did not however apply to workers from Austrian Poland because Austria-Hungary was allied with Germany.) It is plausible that it was because of the longstanding tradition of seasonal migration that the recruitment of Polish workers from border areas persisted even after the outbreak of war, and at least until the treatment of Polish workers worsened considerably and the regulations governing the presence of foreigners in Germany became stricter. In other words, the tradition (prevailing practice) of seasonal migration may have enabled the German authorities to recruit certain categories of labor without the need to resort to too much force. Altogether, between August 1914 and December 1918, approximately 1,550,000 registration cards were issued by the German Foreign Workers' Agency (Deutsche Arbeiterzentrale) to Polish workers, predominantly to workers from Russian Poland (cited in Revue Internationale du Travail, 1922: 331) . By the end of the war, the number of foreign Polish laborers in Germany matched approximately the 1914 level (Bade, 2003: 174) .
The inter-war period
Immediately after WWI, Germany was not interested in hiring seasonal workers from Poland (the Second Polish Republic). German hostility to the 1919 Versailles Treaty in general, and to the loss of much of its eastern provinces of Posen, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia to the newly independent Poland, in particular, strained relations between the two countries. The concern about "re-Polonization" of specific parts of żermany if there were an inflow of Polish workers -a concern that resonates with similar expressed 30 years earlier -continued to shape attitudes towards the employment of workers from Poland. Nor did Poland support its citizens' working in żermany either (an actual ban on seasonal migration to Germany was imposed by Poland in 1920; Kołodziej, 1982) . Nonetheless, the reluctance of the German government to allow German employers to hire workers from nearby Poland, and the lack of a formal bilateral agreement, could not dent the process of matching the demand for foreign workers in Germany with the supply of workers (peasants) from overpopulated, adjacent, and "seasonally experienced" PolandŚ workers were heading for żermany even without contracts, a practice tolerated, and even tacitly supported, both by German employers and the German authorities. The patterns of the past prevailed over the reality of the present.
That Polish migrants went to Germany despite the lack of formal arrangements attests to the importance of the tradition of seasonal migration. Estimates suggest that in [1920] [1921] [1922] [1923] approximately 30,000 Polish workers a year went to Germany, and that in 1924-1926 the figure was approximately 40-50,000 workers (Poniatowska, 1971: 62; Janowska, 1984: 379, 399ś see also Łuczak, 1988: 316) . Although by historical standards these numbers are not large, they are not insignificant either. What makes the sustainability of the flow even more remarkable is that a good number of the German farms to which Poles migrated before 1919 were now in Poland.
Eventually, in 1927, an agreement was finally signed (preceded by preliminary agreements in January and December 1926) recognizing formally the underlying reality. The signing of the 1927 agreement was conditional on the gradual (between 1928 and 1931) 
repatriation to
Poland of approximately 25,000 Polish workers who arrived in Germany after January 1, 1919 and then stayed there. In addition, these workers were given priority during recruitment drives for seasonal work under the agreement. As the bilateral agreement stipulated, workers could spend several months in Germany but were obliged to return home after the completion of their work assignment. Thus, as in the pre-WWI period, the bilateral agreement allowed Poles to work in Germany but not to settle there. However, this constraint may not have been too onerous because many workers had long been willing (if not optimally choosing) to combine residence and work in Poland with seasonal work in German agriculture. (The theory of seasonal migration of Stark and Fan, 2007, formalizes this linkage.) A legal outflow of seasonal workers to Germany under the bilateral agreement occurred between 1926 and 1931 and between 1937 and 1939 . In 1926 ,000 workers went from Poland to Germany, and by 1930 the number had risen to 69,000 -87,000 per year.
Between 1932 and 1936, the numbers of workers were miniscule -between 400 and 1,200 a year. These low numbers were due to restrictions on migration imposed by Germany as a consequence of the world economic crisis. In 1937 the number of workers climbed to approximately 12,200, and in 1938 it reached approximately 64,000. The quota for 1939 was set at 90,000 workers. However, in the wake of growing tensions in Polish-German relations, the flow was curtailed by the Polish government. Yet, once again, the administrative hand could not halt the flow of Polish workers. In April of 1939 the German Ministry of the Interior issued a directive which allowed Polish workers without the necessary papers to be admitted into Germany through labor offices that were set up specifically for that purpose (Herbert, 1990: 131) . The clouds of a looming crisis could not cast too long a shadow: agriculture had to feeding people, farms needed farm hands, and seasonal work filled the gap.
The scale of this undocumented migration is considered, not surprisingly, to have been lower than in the period before the introduction of the bilateral agreement, amounting to a few thousand workers a year. According to Landau (1966) whose account was based on a survey carried out in 1937 among 2,200 Polish seasonal workers in Germany and Latvia, undocumented seasonal migration occurred along the entire Polish-German border. It was brought about because the quotas were inadequate, both for the German employers (the needs of German agriculture) and for the Polish suppliers. Illegal crossings were tolerated by the German authorities (Herbert, 1990: 54) . For example, whereas the 1928 quota assigned by the Polish Emigration Office to the counties of Ostroł ka, Kolno, and Grajewo located in the north of Białystok province on the border with East Prussia was not fulfilled due to lack of candidates, a great many illegal migrants were at work (Wieloch, 1928) . It seems that the tradition of engaging in seasonal migration must have played a role in sustaining undocumented migration from specific areas independent of the limits set by the prevailing legal infrastructure. To farmers and workers who enjoyed mutually beneficial, long term informal contacts, formal or legal procedures were not critical in forging viable links.
As in the preceding periods, seasonal migration did not originate from all the regions of Poland. As can be seen in Appendix 1, Table 3 , between 1926 and 1937, legal seasonal migrants originated mainly from four (out of 16) provinces: Łód , Kielce, Pozna , and Kraków. Before WWI Łód , Kielce, and Kraków provinces were located along the PolishGerman border. Łód and Kielce were part of the Polish Kingdom, while Kraków province was part of Galicia (Austrian Poland). Pozna province was part of Prussian Poland (adjacent to Łód province to the west).
The distribution of the counties of origin of seasonal workers by provinces presented in Appendix 1, Table 4 illustrates the importance of the aforementioned four sending provinces in the legal flow of seasonal workers from Poland to Germany: 94 per cent of the 49,800 job offers for the period between January and mid-April 1928 sent by Deutsche Arbeiterzentrale to Poland at the end of 1927 were for workers from these provinces. Not surprisingly, the main reservoir of workers was Wielu county in Łód province: one-third of all the "job offers" were for workers from this county. After adding four other counties with a number of seasonal workers higher than 2,000, three of which were direct neighbors of Wielu county, we obtain a cluster of five counties from which almost 60 per cent of the workers from the first quota in 1928 were "invited" by żerman employers. Apart from the county of Wielu , these included Sieradz and Radomsko (Nowo-Radomsk in the pre-WWI period) counties from Łód province, and Cz stochowa and Włoszczowa counties from Kielce province (see Appendix 2, Map 2: The Second Polish Republic). An additional cluster, covering 16 per cent of seasonal workers, was made up of counties of Kalisz, Słupca, Konin, Koło, and Turek, as well as Łask and Piotrków in Łód province, traditional suppliers, as we already know, of seasonal migrants in the pre-WWI period, even though they were no longer located at the border with Germany. The main sending areas also included a small cluster of four counties located in Pozna province but glued to Wielu county from the west: Odolanów, Ostrzeszów, K pno, and Ostrów. These counties accounted for approximately 9 per cent of all "job offers."
Seasonal migrants originated from a geographically connected set of counties, and repeatedly from the very same counties.
The job offers sent from Germany were named, quasi named, or anonymous. A named offer was made to a migrant who had participated in seasonal work in preceding years, and who was known to the German employer. As stipulated by the bilateral agreement, such workers were given priority in the recruitment process. A quasi-named offer was made in conjunction with a request that the "named" worker recruit a given number of other workers.
An anonymous offer merely specified the number of workers required. Offers of the first two types predominated in the requests sent to Poland by Deutsche Arbeiterzentrale. That the last listed the counties of origin of prospective workers is quite telling: for the season to come, the German farmers sought to employ either the same workers, or new workers who were brought on board by experienced workers, most likely from the ranks of family members, friends and neighbors, and from the same sending areas. The formation of networks and the operation of tradition were intertwined.
The Polish authorities sought, however, to reorient the seasonal migration flows to new counties and provinces in order to draft the poorest laborers for seasonal work in German agriculture, unlike the preceding practice of recruiting new workers through repeated seasonal migrants. That attempted reorientation was largely futile, however. For example, the Polish Emigration Office sought to reduce the numbers of migrants from Łód and Kielce provinces and increase the numbers of migrants from Stanisławów and Lwów provinces located in the south-east of Poland, that is, far away from Germany. The authorities wanted to forestall economic crisis in regions that traditionally sent workers to German agriculture should seasonal migration abruptly come to a halt, and to allow the poor agricultural south-east region of Poland to benefit from seasonal migration, even though people in this part of Poland had not participated in seasonal migration to Germany before. That interference did not produce the desired effect, despite the fact that the supply of labor in the south-east region of Poland was abundant. Evidently, formal administrative action could not overcome the symbiosis of the tradition of engagement in seasonal work and the developed migration networks, supported by geographical proximity that for a long time had combined to produce a robust seasonal migration stream from the Polish-German border areas.
WWII and its immediate aftermath
As of the mid-1930, Nazi Germany faced a dilemma: to fill the growing labor shortages in the German economy (especially in the agricultural sector) by employing foreign workers, or to rely on German women. In fact, neither the option of using "racially inferior" foreign labor to cultivate German soil, nor that of interfering with women's child-bearing, raising children and caring for their families, was in line with the National Socialist ideology. In addition, the deployment of women as workers was quite unpopular. Drawing on the experience gained during WWI, the German authorities sought to plug the gaps in the German labor market with prisoners of war (POWs); a detailed plan to this effect was already in place by January 1939.
Furthermore, it was anticipated that a sufficiently large number of workers from Poland would be willing to work in Germany as civilian workers. Such an expectation was not unfounded because, as we have already noted, large numbers of Poles elected to work in Germany even as late as the beginning of 1939 when, as a result of increasing pre-war tensions, the legal outflow was halted.
By October 1939, some 213,000 Polish POWs were deployed as forced laborers in Germany, 90 per cent of them in agriculture; by January 1940, their number came close to 300,000 (Madajczyk, 1970; Łuczak, 1979; Herbert, 1997) . As for civilian workers, shortly after the outbreak of the war the German authorities started to set up labor offices in Poland and register unemployed Poles. Interestingly, labor officials (work officers) were often the first civilian authorities to move into Polish towns and villages in the wake of military occupation. Nonetheless, the number of workers willing to work in Germany remained low:
by the end of 1939, only some 40,000 Poles were recruited, mainly from the "traditional" recruitment areas (Herbert, 1997: 62) , although we could not determine whether this low numbers covers only workers from the General Government including Białystok district, but excluding Reichsgau Wartheland -the western part of Poland that was annexed by Nazi Germany at the beginning of the war, and which included Pozna and Łód provinces -and thus also Wielu county, the most significant sending area. Also, seasonal workers who went to Germany after April 15, 1939, when Poland stopped sending workers legally, became the source of the first batch of forced laborers in Germany, those who had been forbidden to return to Poland (Łuczak, 1988: 315) . Apparently, the tradition of Polish seasonal work was sustained to some extent not only during the months between the ending of the legal outflow and the onset of the war, but also past that point in time.
Prior to the war and even when hostilities broke out, Nazi Germany did not consider it necessary to resort to a large-scale deployment of foreign workers. However, it soon proved impossible to run the war economy without significant numbers of foreign workers. A mass deployment of Poles started in January 1940, acting on a directive issued by Hans Frank, the German governor-general in Poland. It is illuminating to cite the directiveŚ "Provision and transport into the Reich of at least one million agricultural and industrial workers -of these, some 750,000 for work in agriculture, at least 50 per cent female -in order to secure agricultural production in the Reich and as a replacement for industrial workers in short supply there" (Herbert, 1990: 133) . In order to meet the supply of workers needed, quotas were assigned to individual districts and municipalities, with village and city mayors held responsible for delivering the required numbers. In addition, the familiar practice of taking up seasonal employment in żerman agriculture was called upon by żerman "recruiters." Once again, citing an original document is quite telling. A propaganda poster from early 1940 reads as followsŚ "Tens of thousands of agricultural workers and laborers familiar with farm work can find jobs under favourable conditions in the German Reich. Even before the war, hundreds of thousands of Polish agrarian workers were employed in German agriculture on an annual basis. … Agricultural workers are allowed to transfer enough money from their savings to provide for the living expenses of family members back in Poland. … Provisions have been made for good accommodation and meals on żerman farms" (Herbert, 1997: 81) .
In a way, this was a drive aimed at institutionalizing tradition.
The Polish population's resistance to working in Germany grew as information became available about the working and living conditions there. Consequently, by the end of April 1940, whenever the assigned quotas could not be filled in a given locality, coercive measures were implemented: workers were drafted in even through man hunts in the streets of occupied Poland. Altogether, by the end of July 1940, some 310,000 Polish civilians were forcibly conscripted and brought to Germany to work there. Together with the POWs whose status was changed in the summer of 1940 to "civilian workers," approximately 700,000 Poles were working in Germany at that time (Madajczyk, 1970; Łuczak, 1979; Herbert, 1990: 131; Herbert, 2001 ).
The significance of Polish workers in the pool of workers conscripted for the German war economy diminished when workers from other countries became available as the war progressed. Altogether, by August 1944 approximately 7,616,000 foreign workers were employed in Germany (and the annexed territories). These workers included 2,750,000 forced laborers from the Soviet Union, whose conscription began late in the autumn of 1941 following the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of that year, and who constituted the largest share. Poles, the second largest group, comprised approximately 1,688,000 workers, of whom 1,125,000 were employed in agriculture (Łuczak, 1979; Herbert, 1997) . Moreover, nearly 70 per cent of the foreigners who worked in agriculture were from Poland. Thus, at least in some mutated form, the practice of seasonal migration of Polish workers for work in German agriculture persisted even during the war years.
The level of coercion applied to the employment of Polish workers, as well as their working and living conditions, changed in the course of the war period. As we have already noted, for some time after the outbreak of the war, the practice of seasonal work in German agriculture was maintained. That the German rural population was friendly towards Polish workers was both a consequence of the tradition of relying on Polish workers to tend German agriculture in the peak growing season, and a force contributing to the continuation of that practice. At least initially, the policy of Nazi Germany towards Polish workers was characterized by an apparent tension between, on the one hand, acceptance and reliance on the tradition of employing Polish workers for seasonal work, especially in Eastern Germany and, on the other hand, an effort to break with this tradition, as eating from the hands of an inferior race was not aligned with Nazi ideology. It is interesting to note how far the German authorities went in their drive to sever the hold of the tradition of seasonal migration and foster attitudes hostile to the practice. To that end, the authorities launched a series of measures aimed at impressing the German rural population that "employing a Pole before the war was wholly different from employing the Pole now" (Herbert, 1997: 64) . These measures included a propaganda campaign specifying alleged atrocities committed by Poles, as well as a codex of decrees, issued in March 1940, that drastically worsened the working and living conditions of Polish civilian laborers (Madajczyk, 1970) . 
The power of "established" tradition: seasonal migration from Poland to Germany at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries
The migration environment in the four decades 1950s through the 1980s was shaped in large part by the political perceptions of the communist regime with its plethora of restrictions on international migration (Stola, 2001; Kaczmarczyk, 2005; Stola, 2010) . Because of its political stance and Cold War alienation, Poland was not among the countries that regularly and systematically provided labor to the booming economies of West Germany and other west European countries. As a consequence, migration from communist Poland, and in particular seasonal migration to Germany, was far from a seamless reactivation of the pre-war migration. In many ways, the iron curtain was also an economic wall.
International mobility from Poland did not come to a halt, however, and Germany, both West and East, was a dominant destination. One of the few formal migration channelsespecially in the first two decades of the communist regime -was permanent migration to West and East Germany of Aussiedler -people claiming German origin. Except for a few years of relaxation, the outflow of Aussiedler was however restricted, and usually confined to the reunion of close family members. However, with the passage of time, this opportunity was exploited not only by "real" Aussiedler but also economic migrants. In addition, with the gradual liberalization of travel abroad by the end of the 1960s, Poles were not only increasingly using this opportunity as such, but were also increasingly taking up illegal jobs while abroad, and many of them opted to stay in the West for longer. Some of them worked legally in East Germany or in Czechoslovakia on the basis of various bilateral agreements signed by Poland with other socialist countries (Glorius, 2008; Stola, 2010) . Inefficiencies in the centrally-planned economy and underdeveloped trade between the countries of the socialist bloc reinforced the will to leave (Stola, 2001) , despite the fact that legal employment of Poles in the West was closely regulated by the State. Furthermore, the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981 "produced" large numbers of political refugees as well as regular migrants who, as they happened to be abroad in December 1981, declined to return to Poland (Stola, 2010) . Overall, during 1950 Overall, during -1989 , approximately 1.1 million people left Poland permanently, of whom approximately 250,000 did so in the 1980s. In addition, in the 1980s about 800,000 people, 90 per cent of whom went abroad under the pretext of tourism, family, or business travel, had not returned to Poland by December 31, 1989, the year in which there was a regime change and the opening up of the country started. To these numbers we need to add millions of short-term trips. For example, in 1981 For example, in -1989 there were approximately 9 million such visits to "capitalist countries," more than 80 per cent of which lasted no more than 60 days (Sakson, 2002) . One of the most important destinations for both permanent and shortterm visits by Polish migrants was Germany, both West and East (Sakson, 2002) . Even if only a small fraction of the short-term visitors from Poland were in search of informal work in German agriculture, the absolute numbers would still be substantial.
Legal migration to Germany resumed in 1990, when Poland and Germany signed a number of bilateral agreements. Under a December 1990 agreement, Poles were allowed to take up seasonal jobs in Germany for up to three months a year, to be arranged by the labor offices of the two countries. The agreement included provisions for the employment in Germany of border workers (living not more than 50 km away from the border), and of Polish students during their summer holidays. Similar agreements were signed in January 1990 (covering posted workers -workers employed by Polish employers who were sent to work in another country, as was often the case in the construction sector) and in June 1990 (guest-workers).
Thus, unlike in the interwar period, seasonal workers were not the only foreign workers gaining legal access to the German labor market.
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Both Poland and Germany expected to benefit from the December 1990 agreement:
Poland, because seasonal work abroad could help alleviate the pain of rapidly growing unemployment at home (officially non-existent before 1989); and Germany because foreign workers could take up jobs in sectors of the economy that, because of relatively low wages and low prestige, were not attractive to native workers. Although seasonal employment was not restricted to particular sectors of the German economy, more than 90 per cent of all the seasonal workers from Poland took up jobs in German agriculture.
3 Agriculture was inviting to Polish migrants looking for short-term jobs because there was strong demand and correspondingly assured employment and good pay for foreign workers in that sector. This work climate has existed especially since the 1970s, as German women increasingly took up regular, full-time jobs, and young Germans increasingly prolonged their studies as the returns to education in Germany have risen. Poles -the traditional suppliers of seasonal work -were able to adjust to the increasing demand quite easily.
By the end of the 20th century, seasonal migration from Poland to Germany had quickly become the dominant form of migration from Poland, with the number of workers growing year by year. In fact, this was one of the very few opportunities for Poles to take up legal jobs in the EU before the "old" EU countries had began, Germany (K pi ska, 2008). Thus, whatever lull existed in communist times, it did not quell the propensity for seasonal migration once such an engagement was fully permitted.
Despite formal procedures involving local labor offices in Poland, in 1991 -the first full year of the "life" of the bilateral agreement -more than 90 per cent of all job offers sent from Germany to Poland were already named offers, that is, offers made to specific workers (whose names and addresses were known to the German employers); and this share remained stable over subsequent years. That employers already knew the names of their would-be employees implies that informal relations between employers and workers forged before the agreement was signed contributed to the persistence of this form of migration. As in the interwar period, the bilateral agreement placed pre-existing seasonal flows in a formal framework, albeit the "contents" existed well before the "framework." In spite of the restrictions placed by communist Poland on international mobility, the flows between Poland and Germany could not be stopped, and the participants in the flows (Aussiedler, asylum seekers, economic migrants, contract workers) must have constituted valuable contacts who could help find short-term jobs if these were to become available, and sought. People who for a variety of reasons were in Germany as a result of WWII and decided not to return to communist Poland could, too, serve in this capacity. Often, having a contact in Germany (an address) was sufficient to obtain a passport and/or a visa, and to enable people to look for jobs on their Because the areas in Poland that supplied new seasonal migrants included areas from which seasonal workers had come in the past, it is plausible that at least to some extent tradition played a role in rekindling the flows. While geographical proximity ceased, tradition did not. Poverty and unemployment were not specific to these areas, nor was it the case that these areas had an edge in participating in seasonal migration because of an acquired specialty in performing agriculture-related tasks. Between 1939 and 1989, the occupational structure of the countryside which provided seasonal migrants changed markedly, with almost no peasants in the pre-WWII sense of the word. Yet, in spite of all these factors and considerations, the traditional sources of supply did not dry up. The picture that emerges is that source communities that took part in seasonal migration over long periods of time in the past were "stubborn" contributors to seasonal migration in more recent times. The decisions made by past seasonal migrants affect the environment in which individuals make their seasonal migration choices today; beneficial decisions within families and favorable experience within communities could have influenced generations to come. Consequently, members of a community from which migration occurred before may have found it quite "natural" to engage in seasonal migration.
The presence of the other two regions ("Southwest Poland" and "Southeast Poland") among the lead sending regions of seasonal workers to Germany in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century also suggests that in shaping the seasonal migration flows, tradition has gone hand in hand with the operation of networks. As already noted, these networks were developed over the five decades after WWII, and helped in establishing contacts between German farmers and Polish workers, and thus in the (re-)creation of the seasonal migration infrastructure. For example, several provinces located in the southwest part of Poland that had belonged to Germany prior to WWII (Wrocław, Jelenia Góra, Opole, and Wałbrzych) or prior to WWI (Katowice) were major suppliers of Aussiedler in the period after WWII (especially the provinces of Katowice and Opole) (Gawryszewski, 2005; Stola, 2010) .
In addition, as the spatial distribution reveals, from the beginning of the 1990s, seasonal migrants originated from big cities located in four remaining provinces, namely Warszawa, Pozna , Kraków, and Gda sk. Presumably, this was a continuation of the tendency of big cities to dominate the migration outflow from Poland in the 1980s (Sakson, 2002) . It is noteworthy that the inhabitants of these provinces nearly disappeared from the seasonal migration scene in the course of the subsequent decade; they were not traditional actors in or beneficiaries of seasonal migration, only joining in under the particular conditions of the 1980s. In the absence of a tradition of seasonal migration, such spells of migration can well become passing phenomena.
Concluding reflections
For more than a century, Polish workers have provided a source of seasonal labor for German agriculture. Although, as we have seen, after WWII the outflow of seasonal workers from
Poland to żermany was interrupted for decades, a subdued "Polish tradition" percolatedś tradition played a sustaining and distinct role. It is one thing to expect an individual to accumulate expertise after doing something repeatedly over his or her own lifetime; it is another to observe a sequence of generations displaying intergenerational "specialization."
That generation after generation people in specific areas in Poland have resorted to seasonal migration to Germany suggests that this has become a way of life, an acquired way of making ends meet, a tradition.
The shifting and dismantling of borders provide natural tests for assessing the role of Germany in 1926 Germany in , 1928 Germany in , 1930 Germany in , and 1937 Total of 49 provinces 68,516 132,894 201,681 282,826 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 * The 2002 data were collected for 49 provinces, even though as of 1999, in the wake of administrative reform, the number of provinces was reduced to 16. SourceŚ Authors' calculations, National Labor Office of Poland, unpublished data on the numbers of job offers sent by żermany to Poland, cited in K pi ska 2008.
